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1 Introduction  
 
Over the last decade many studies have made use of the gravity model to evaluate the 
impact of non-reciprocal preferential trade policies (hereafter NRPTPs) on the export 
performance of developing countries. The aim of this paper is to provide new empirical 
evidence in this area of research.  
A NRPTP is a concession granted to developing countries by a developed 
country on a unilateral basis, that is without reciprocal preferences for the donor’s 
exports. Beneficiary countries either have duty-free access to the donor’s market or 
enjoy preferential tariff and, as a result of this special treatment, an increase in their 
exports towards the preference-giving country is expected to occur. The main active 
NRPTP is the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) recommended by UNCTAD in 
1968 and implemented by major developed countries since the early ’70s. Today, under 
the GSP, the exports of selected products of about 150 developing countries benefit 
from reduced tariffs when entering donor markets. Apart from the GSP, virtually all 
developing countries are members of at least one other preferential trade scheme 
granted by a developed country to favour their exports. Bhagwati (1995) defined the 
complex system of crisscrossing trade preferences as a spaghetti-bowl.1 
The gravitational approach offers a framework for assessing whether NRPTPs 
affect trade flows from beneficiaries to donors. In its simplest form, the gravity model 
posits that the normal level of trade is positively affected by the economic mass of the 
trading countries (richer and larger nations both export and import more) and 
negatively influenced by the geographical distance between them. The “normal” level 
of trade is the average level of trade in a world free of trade barriers, preferential 
treatments and trade agreements. Such a “normal” level is defined as the counterfactual. 
When developed countries grant special treatment to exports from developing 
countries, they introduce a disturbance into the model that defines the counterfactual 
                                                 
1 Another form of trade preference is represented by regional free-trade areas between developed and 
developing countries. However, this involves reciprocal preferences and does not constitute an 
example of trade preferences for developing countries in a strict sense. 
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and, hence, ceteris paribus, deviations from the “normal” level of trade are 
interpretable as the effect of the preferential policy.  
Gravity models have a long and well-established history in the explanation of 
trade (Tinbergen, 1962; Pöyhonen 1963) and they have been used to specifically study 
the impact of NRPTPs by Sapir (1981), Oguledo and Macphee (1994), Nouve and 
Staatz (2003), Persson and Wilhelmsson (2007), Nilsson (2002, 2007), Verdeja (2006), 
Lederman and Özden (2004), Subramanian and Wei (2007) and Goldstein et al. (2003). 
These papers share three common practices. The first is that they evaluate the impact of 
preferences granted by one or two donors only, usually the EU and/or the US. The 
second common denominator is their focus on total exports from the beneficiary to the 
donor countries, except for the work by Sapir (1981), which focuses on manufactured 
imports in both aggregate and disaggregated trade flows. Lastly, they model NRPTPs 
by augmenting the gravity model with a preference dummy. 
These methodological choices are misleading if the aim of the analysis is to 
evaluate the impact of a specific trade policy – the preferential trade preference - which 
is conceived of as being applied at product level. To be more precise, the main 
motivation for this study lies in the belief that the objective of NRPTPs is not to affect 
the total trade of the beneficiaries, but to alter the incentives for developing countries to 
export more in those specific sectors in which preferences are granted. In light of these 
considerations, we argue that when overall exports are considered, the impact of 
NRPTPs might be not correctly estimated.2 Hence, evidence based on disaggregated 
data is needed. Along this line, we use both total and 2-digit level trade flows as an 
attempt to verify the robustness of results passing from a higher to a lower aggregation 
of data. 
We follow the literature with regards the framework of analysis to be used, that 
is the gravity model, and the method to measure the preferential treatment, which is 
gauged by using the dummy approach. All this allows us to pursue two aims. On one 
hand,  when using aggregated data the outcomes we obtain are comparable to those of 
other studies that augment the gravity equation of total trade flows with preference 
dummies. On the other hand, given the empirical setting (gravity models and preference 
                                                 
2 For instance, if the export shares of sectors that account for a higher margin of preference are small, 
then the aggregate flow probably does not change enough for the impact of NRPTPs to be picked up 
in the econometric analysis. 
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dummies), the use of disaggregated data permits to verify if trade flows aggregation 
matters in determining the impact of NRPTPs. If it matters then we will shed some 
lights on the fact that the evidence achieved when using total trade and dummy 
variables should be read with extreme care. Nevertheless, the dummy approach is not 
exempt of criticism that we will outline in drawing some concluding remarks (see § 7).  
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we consider three levels of data 
aggregation: total exports, total agricultural exports and export flows for ten groups of 
agricultural products at 2-digit level. Agricultural trade has been chosen because of the 
higher margin of trade preferences enjoyed by developing countries in agriculture with 
respect to other sectors. We expect that the regressions run at each level of data 
aggregation will yield different values for the coefficients associated with the 
preference dummy. In other words, when focusing on sectors enjoying a large margin 
of preferences, we expect that the estimates are higher than those obtained using 
aggregated data. Such differences will be considered as evidence in favour of the fact 
that aggregation matters in estimating the role of NRPTPs. If this is the case, we will 
argue that the conclusions about the effectiveness of NRPTPs should be drawn by 
looking at regressions run at the most disaggregated level to distinguish properly 
sectors in which preferences are granted from those where preferences are not given. 
Secondly, for each level of data aggregation we consider export flows, whatever the 
country-source, towards the OECD members which grant almost all one-way trade 
preferences (EU15, USA, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand). Hence, the set of non-reciprocal preferential trade arrangements analysed in 
this study covers almost all one-way programs granted by developed to developing 
countries over the period under scrutiny (1995-2003).   
By taking into account unobserved country heterogeneity, non-random 
selection, and the potential endogeneity of trade preferences, we find that NRPTPs 
granted by OECD countries enhance, on average, the exports of beneficiaries. 
However, results differ according to the data aggregation and to the preferential trade 
agreement analysed. For instance, we show that the total exports of eligible countries 
are not significantly affected by the ordinary GSP, while the GSP for LDCs is more 
effective. In this respect, the main source of trade gains for developing countries is 
represented by NRPTPs other than GSP. Furthermore, it emerges that preferential 
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treatment affects total agricultural exports more than overall exports. Finally, we find 
that the estimated impact of NRPTPs at  2-digit level is heterogeneous. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly overviews the related 
literature, while section 3 describes the gravity model. Section 4 presents data and 
variables used. Sections 5, describes how we deal with the main econometric issues 
thought to be present in gravity empirics. Section 6 presents the results obtained. 
Section 7 concludes.  
 2 Related Literature 
 
The literature that uses gravity equations to specifically assess the impact of NRPTPs is 
comprised of the following papers:3 Sapir (1981), Oguledo and Macphee (1994), Nouve 
and Staatz (2003), Persson and Wilhelmsson (2007), Nilsson (2002 and 2007), Verdeja 
(2006), Lederman and Özden (2004), Subramanian and Wei (2007) and Goldstein et al. 
(2003).4 
Sapir (1981) quantifies the effects of the EU’s GSP by considering the imports 
of manufactures from 10 developing countries. By estimating a gravity equation on a 
yearly basis from 1967 to 1978 he finds that EU GSP exerts a positive impact on trade, 
but he acknowledges that this “partly reflects our choice of beneficiaries which supply 
the bulk of EEC preferential imports” (Sapir, 1981: 351). 
Oguledo and Macphee (1994) estimate the effect of GSP, Lomé, EFTA and 
Mediterranean agreements analysing total exports of 162 countries to 11 countries (EU 
as one, USA, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Australia, Austria, Canada, New Zealand, 
Finland and Switzerland) in 1976. To model trade preferences, the authors use 
dummies, which capture the trade diversion effect of preferences, and the import tariffs 
                                                 
3 We do not survey all the gravity model literature where NRPTPs are used simply as controlling 
variables in models set up to study other trade issues (i.e. Rose  2005a and 2005b). Neither do we 
consider those papers which investigate the effects of GSP on developing countries total trade (i.e. 
Rose 2004). This is because we are interested in studying the impact of NRPTPs on export 
performance, rather than on trade openness. Besides, “all theories that underlie a gravity-like 
specification yield predictions on unidirectional trade rather than total trade” (Subramanian and Wei 
2007: 157). For a review of the papers aimed at assessing the impact of preferential trade policies 
(reciprocal and non reciprocal) using gravity models see Cardamone (2007), while a detailed survey 
of the approaches other than gravity is provided by Nielsen (2003). 
4 We focus on the empirical applications of gravity models. However, many studies provide theoretical  
explanations for why gravity equations seem to explain trade patterns so well. Some recent influential 
contributions to the theory of gravity models are those by Anderson and Wincoop (2004), Bergstrand 
(1989) and Deardoff (1995).  
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that gauge the trade creation effect of lower tariffs. Results show a significant effect on 
exports of both dummies and tariffs.  
The study by Nilsson (2002) indicates that from 1975 to 1992 the EU’s GSP and 
the Lomé Convention exert a positive and significant impact on the exports of 
beneficiaries. In a more recent study, Nilsson (2007) compares the effect of EU and US 
preferential trade policies from 2001 to 2003 and argues that developing countries gain 
more from EU policies than from US ones. The paper by Nouve and Staatz (2003) 
focuses on the impact of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) on 
agricultural exports from Sub-Saharan African countries (SSA) to the US over the 
period 1999-2002. The authors find a positive, albeit insignificant, impact of AGOA. 
Moreover, their fixed effect model has a very low explanatory power and, hence, their 
findings cannot be considered as a reliable evidence of AGOA impact. 
Persson and Wilhelmsson (2007) investigate the impact on EU imports of both 
trade preference schemes and EU enlargements from 1960 to 2002. Their argument is 
that when a country joins the EU, it will trade less than before with developing 
countries, but at the same time it will grant trade preferences to developing countries. 
The net impact of these two contrasting forces on EU imports appears negative. Only 
ACPs benefit from preferential agreements, once the negative enlargement effect is 
accounted for.    
Verdeja (2006) analyses the effectiveness of NRPTPs granted by the EU to 
developing countries over the period 1973-2000. He estimates cross-section regressions 
and finds a substantial gain for ACPs. Moreover, the GSP positively affects the exports 
of beneficiaries, although its impact is lower than that estimated for ACPs. After 
controlling for country heterogeneity, the GSP dummy becomes negative. Verdeja 
(2006) argues that this outcome is due to the low utilization that the countries eligible 
make of GSP preferences.  
Lederman and Özden (2004) consider US imports in 1997 and 2001 and the 
impact of NRPTPs is evaluated by following the dummy approach and using an index 
of the utilization made by countries eligible for preferences. The estimations show that, 
in 1997, the countries belonging to the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) exported 136 
percent more than other countries, the gain for Andean countries was 42 percent and the 
countries eligible for GSP treatment exported 17 percent less. After repeating the 
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analysis for 2001,  the authors find that the impact of CBI and Andean agreements was 
higher than that relative to 1997, while the impact of AGOA was negative. This 
evidence is ascribed to the high negative correlation between distance and the AGOA 
dummy, to the expanded preferential benefits of CBI and Andean programs in 2000 and 
to the increased experience of exporters in taking advantage of trade preferences. 
Finally, Subramanian and Wei (2007) and Goldstein et al. (2003) focus on the 
impact of GSP, using an extensive sample of countries (more than 170) over a very 
long period [1948-2001 in Goldstein et al. (2003) and 1950-2000 in Subramanian and 
Wei, 2007)]. A significant and positive impact of GSP preferences on total trade is 
found in both studies. At a more disaggregated level, the GSP program positively 
affects trade in the clothing and food industries, but its effect is negative in footwear 
and agri-food sectors (Subramanian and Wei, 2007).  
From a methodological perspective it is worth noting that Sapir (1981), Oguledo 
and Macphee (1994) and Nilsson (2002; 2007) use  OLS on cross-sectional data. Thus, 
these papers disregard the role played by country-fixed effects: all the factors that 
potentially affect trade flows, besides gravity variables (GDPs and distance), are 
assumed to be common across countries. The more recent studies by Nouve and Staatz 
(2003), Persson and Wilhelmsson (2007), Verdeja (2006), Subramanian and Wei 
(2007) and Goldstein et al. (2003) attempt to overcome this shortcoming by using fixed 
effect estimators. Finally, no paper, except for Lederman and Özden (2004),5  tests for 
endogeneity of NRPTPs and all the analyses are restricted to countries that trade with 
each other. The use of positive trade values might introduce a selection bias because the 
sample might no longer be random.  
Summing up, this brief review reveals that the question of how properly to 
specify and estimate the gravity equation in order to assess the impact of NRPTPs is 
still open. We depart from these studies by analysing three datasets (total exports, total 
agricultural exports and 10 groups of agricultural products) and by using different 
procedures to control for potential biases in estimations. 
                                                 
5 In order to take into account zero trade flows, Lederman and Özden (2004) consider a Tobit model, 
employ a two-step instrumental variable method to check for endogeneity of  the preference dummy 
and the Heckman Maximum Likelihood estimator to control for data censoring bias. 
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3 Empirical setting: the gravity equation 
 
A gravity model states that the trade flows between two countries can be explained by 
three kinds of variables. The first describes the potential demand of the importers, the 
second considers the supply conditions of exporters and the third consists of all the 
factors that may hinder or favour the bilateral trade flow (i.e., distance, common border, 
language, past colonial ties, religion, tariffs, ect.). In all the applications of the gravity 
models, traders’ GDPs are used as proxy of their demand and supply conditions. 
Populations are additional variables that gauge the economic masses of trade partners. 
Furthermore, geographical distance is used as a proxy of transport costs and cultural 
dissimilarities and it is expected to be negatively correlated to trade. GDPs, populations 
and distance are referred to as gravitational variables and are assumed to determine the 
“normal” pattern of trade in the absence of any disturbance.  
The appeal of the gravity approach derives from the opportunity it offers to 
study deviations from the “normal” trade pattern. This is done by including in the 
model new variables affecting trade. In our case, we extend the model by considering 
the preferential trade policies, which entail unilateral reductions in trade barriers 
granted by developed to developing countries. Hence, other things being equal, they are 
expected to stimulate exports from developing countries to donors yielding a higher 
flow of trade than that which would “normally” be expected. 
The specification of the gravity model adopted in this study is the following:  
 
ijtijt
LDC
ijt
ORD
ijt
ijtijijijijijij
jtitjtitijt
uOtherGSPGSP
RTALANDISLCOLBORLANGDIS
POPPOPGDPGDPX
++++
++++++++
+++++=
321
7654321
4321
)ln(
)ln()ln()ln()ln()ln(
βββ
λλλλλλλ
ααααα
     (1) 
where subscript i refers to the exporters, j to the importers, and t to time. The dependent 
variable X differs according to the level of data aggregation used: X represents either 
the total exports, or the total agricultural exports or the exports of 2-digit agricultural 
products. GDP is the Gross Domestic Product, POP is the population and DIS is the 
distance between the capital cities. The component ijtu  is the error term whose structure 
will be discussed later (cfr § 5). To control for observable country-pair specific factors 
affecting bilateral trade, the model includes some dummy variables. In particular, 
LANG and BOR are two binary variables set to unity if the trade partners share a 
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common language or border, respectively. COL is a binary variable which is unity if 
country i was a colony of country j. ISL and LAND are the number of islands and 
landlocked countries in the pair, respectively. The variable RTA (Regional Trade 
Agreements) is a dummy variable set to unity if i and j belong to the same RTA (such 
as, EFTA, NAFTA or a bilateral agreement between the trading countries), and zero 
otherwise.  
Concentrating on the most interesting coefficients for our analysis, the GSP and 
Other dummies are intended to capture the marginal effect of different arrangements on 
export flows (we define these dummies in section 4). The sign of 1β , 2β  and 3β  is 
expected to be positive. The intuition behind this expectation is clear: the dummies 
attempt to capture the effect of preferential treatment. Presumably, a beneficiary 
country will be induced to export towards the preference-giving country more than it 
would do in the counterfactual, i.e. were it not receiving that specific trade preference.  
4 Data and Variables 
 
The trade statistics are drawn from the Comtrade dataset. The set of importing countries 
is comprised of the eight major OECD members (Australia, Canada, EU15 as a whole, 
Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and USA), while the exporters are 184, that 
is all the countries for which trade statistics are available (the exporters are listed in 
Appendix A). In order not to have to deal with complications due to EU enlargements, 
the period under scrutiny covers the years from 1995 to 2003. Each annual bilateral 
export flow is an observation (the sample includes the exports from one OECD to the 
other OECD countries).  
Working on three different levels of trade flows (total exports, total agricultural 
exports and the exports of ten 2-digit aggregation of agricultural products6) we have 
three unbalanced panel data of different sizes. If we only consider positive trade values 
over the period 1995-2003, there are 11457 observations in the case of total exports, 
                                                 
6 The ten groups of products correspond to the 2-digit commodity SITC codes: Live Animals (00); Meat 
and Meat Preparations (01); Dairy Products and Bird Eggs (02); Fish, Crustaceans, Mollusc and 
Preparations Thereof (03); Cereals and Cereal Preparations (04); Vegetables and Fruit (05); Sugar, 
Sugar Preparations and Honey (06); Coffee, Tea, Cocoa, Spices and Manufactures Thereof (07); 
Feeding Stuff for Animals (08); Miscellaneous Edible Products and Preparations (09). 
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9292 observations for total agricultural exports, and 43518 observations when the focus 
is on 2-digit agricultural products.  
As far as the explanatory variables are concerned, data of GDP and population 
are from the World Development Indicators 2005. The geographical distance is the 
great circle distance between the capital cities of the two countries (the source is 
http://www.wcrl.ars.usda.gov/cec/java/lat-long.htm). The database provided by Rose 
(2004) is the source used to construct the observable pair-specific determinants of 
export flows (ISL, LAND, LAN, BOR and COL). Moreover, the dummy RTA is 
created using information drawn from a WTO database available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ region_e/region_e.htm (the RTA we consider are 
listed in Appendix B). All variables in value are in constant 2000 US dollar. 
In order to construct the key variables of our analysis (the dummies GSP and 
Other) we consulted the annual tariff schedules published by each preference-giving 
country and the handbooks of the eight GSP programs 7 and constructed the preference 
dummies starting from the most disaggregated level of data. For each country pair-line 
of products, the preference dummy Other is equal to unity if there is at least one 
individual good within that 2-digit line that receives a preferential treatment under a 
scheme other than GSP, whatever the type and the extent of the preference. This is done 
for every year over the period 1995-2003 and, hence, the dummies take also into 
account the inclusion/exclusion of individual countries from year to year on political or 
other grounds. The same criterion applies for the GSP dummies. 
In the gravity models analysing total exports and total agricultural exports, the 
preference dummies are constructed using the information available at the commodity 
group level: hence, if Other (or GSPORD, GSPLDC) is unity for at least one of the ten 
groups of agricultural products, then it will be unity in the other two aggregations (total 
                                                 
7 To be more precise, for the US we used the annual General Notes of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule, 
whereas for the EU we take data from TARIC, available on the website of the Official Journal of the 
European Communities. For EU data not available on internet (from 1995 to 1998), we retrieved the 
relevant information from Persson and Wilhelmsson (2007). As far as Australia, Canada, Japan and 
New Zealand are concerned, data are taken from their National Customs Service. A list of worldwide 
data availability of tariffs is provided by the International Trade Administration of the US 
Department of Commerce at http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/tic/ (tariff and fee information section). As for 
GSP, we also used the handbooks and, for comparison, the “List of GSP beneficiaries” provided by 
the GSP office at UNCTAD and updated to 2001. 
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agricultural exports and total exports).8  The preferential schemes used to construct the 
dummy Other are specific for each OECD country (see Appendix B).  
Before implementing the econometric analysis we address some data issues 
concerning the exports to the eight selected OECD countries. Like most sources of 
trade statistics, Comtrade only reports the positive trade flows declared by each country 
at face value. This problem is usually solved by treating all non-reported trade values as 
missing. This procedure is correct if all the left out data are missing and the restricted 
sample of positive trade pairs is not systematically different from the sample of missing 
country-pairs and from that of country-pairs which do not trade with each other. Since 
these conditions are not normally observable in international trade, we address the issue 
of non-reported data as follows: we assume that the accuracy of our group of OECD 
importers in recording data is high and, hence, the incidence of missing values in our 
dataset should be limited.9 Consequently, all non-reported data with regards total 
imports are treated as zero-trade values.10 This assumption made for the more 
aggregated level is also applied to the other two data aggregations. Therefore, we 
attribute zero to the non-reported 1-digit and 2-digit  agricultural data.11  
As table 1 indicates, many developing countries are eligible for more than one 
preferential treatment. This overlapping has been addressed by (a) properly defining the 
preference dummies and (b) introducing a count variable.  
 
                                                 
8 It is worth noting that our preference dummies coincide with those that one would obtain using the 
criterion of country eligibility for preferential treatments. This may be due to the fact that tariffs are 
defined at a very disaggregated level (usually at 6-digit basis) and the 2-digit SITC codes are large 
enough to include at least one product that enjoys trade preferences. 
9 Our assumption is corroborated by some evidence. As we said before, for each country pair we use 
import values, as they are generally more accurate than export values. The discrepancy between 
export and import values is frequent in Comtrade, but the array of data declared by importers is far 
more complete than that obtained from exporters. This might be due to the fact that importers need to 
collect tariffs and, therefore, have an interest in proper recording. Similar incentives may be absent 
on the part of exporters. 
10 After a careful comparison of different trade statistics (Comtrade, national account statistics, data from 
WTO and IMF), Gleditsch (2002) shows that 80% of non-recorded data in IMF Direction of Trade 
Statistics (DoTS) are zero-trade values. Gleditsch (2002) takes into account trade flows of both 
developed and developing countries. Given the higher accuracy of developed countries in recording 
data, this percentage should be much higher for our selected OECD countries.  
11 We checked the consistency of the declared data in Comtrade. For example, we verified that total 
world imports of each OECD country at time t is always equal to the imports from each partner. The 
same applies at 1-digit agricultural level. However, as regards data at 2-digit level, we observe that 
the declared data at 1-digit agricultural level are often slightly different than the sum of the values at 
2-digit agricultural level. However, we always substitute zero for the missing values as the 
differences obtained are negligible (the maximum being 76 US $ only). 
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[Table 1, about here] 
 
The first way of solving the overlapping of preferential treatments is based on 
the following assumption. We assume that the preferential treatment received by a 
developing country under one of the trade agreements subsumed in the dummy variable 
Other Preferences is more favourable than that received from GSP (Ordinary or for 
LDCs). Therefore, whenever a country is eligible under both the GSP and another 
preferential scheme, it will ask for the latter treatment.12 This order allows us to define 
the preference dummies included in equation [1] as follows: the dummy GSPORD 
(GSPLDC) is equal to unity if the exports of country i to country j enjoy preferential 
treatment only from the ordinary GSP (GSP for LDCs), while the dummy Other 
Preferences is equal to unity if country i enjoys preferential treatment from country j  
other than GSP and is zero otherwise.  
Besides the use of three separate preference dummies, we deal with the presence 
of overlapping areas by defining a polytomous variable, named Pref Ord. It assumes 
higher values as the number of preferential schemes which a country belongs to 
increases. More precisely, it takes on the following values: zero if the export flow from 
country i to country j receives no preferential treatment (group A in table 1); one if it is 
regulated under the ordinary GSP only (group B1); two if there is a preference from the 
GSP for LDCs only (group B2); three if the only preferential treatment received is that 
from Other Preferences (group B3); four if the trade flow enjoys preferential treatment 
by ordinary GSP and Other Preferences (group B4); finally, Pref Ord is five if the 
exports flow is eligible for a preferential treatment from the GSP for LDCs and from 
Other Preferences (group B5).13 The use of this polytomous variable is meant to 
provide an overall assessment of the effectiveness of trade preferences. 
                                                 
12 This assumption is partially supported by the empirical evidence reported in Bureau, Chakir and 
Gallezot (2007). The authors show that some preferential agreements (i.e. the Lomé/Cotonou 
convention and the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act) are systematically preferred by 
exporters to GSP when the preference regimes overlap in terms of product coverage. 
13 An example may help to explain the rationale underlying the variable Pref Ord. Let’s assume that 
some exports of a beneficiary country are eligible for preferential treatment from GSP and Other 
Preferences (the country belongs to group B4 in table 1). Thus, the aggregated data include the 
exports of products benefiting from GSP preferences and exports of products enjoying Other 
Preferences. Therefore, both preferential schemes contribute to determine the aggregated trade flows 
of that country. 
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5 Econometric issues: heterogeneity, endogeneity and non-random 
selection 
 
One of the main issues to be addressed in using the gravity model to analyse trade 
flows is the country (and country-pair) heterogeneity. Heterogeneity may be due to 
observable and non-observable factors.14 From an econometric perspective, the 
omission of such factors renders gravity equations mis-specified, and bound to produce 
biased and/or inconsistent estimates. When heterogeneity derives from observable 
determinants, which define the country-pair background, (i.e., common language, 
colonial past, border, religion, ect.) a set of dummies may be employed to capture their 
influence (cfr. eq. [1]). However, this approach does not thoroughly control for dyadic 
heterogeneity, unless all unobservable country-pair fixed effects are captured by the 
country-pair background. The use of fixed effects models allows controlling for non-
observable heterogeneity.  
In this paper, we adopt a general decomposition of the error term recently 
advocated in gravity empirics (Carrère, 2006; Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2003), expressed 
as follows: 
ijtijijtu ευ +=           (2) 
where ijυ are time-invariant dyadic fixed effects and ijtε  is the idiosyncratic error term. 
An implicit assumption underlying the fixed effects estimations is that 
regressors are strictly exogenous. There is, of course, no a priori reason to expect this to 
be the case (Baier and Bergstrand, 2004). Indeed, on theoretical grounds, a reverse 
causation is likely to exist between imports and trade protection (and hence the margin 
of preference granted to preferred countries) of the preference-giving country. As 
Özden and Reinhardt (2005, p. 19) point out “GSP eligibility has been shown to be 
negatively affected by export volume”. A similar  argument may be provided for the 
RTA dummy: the trade flows between two countries may affect the probability of 
signing a RTA. 
                                                 
14 For example, a nation may be characterized by a certain propensity to export (or import), which may 
be independent of GDP and time invariant. Moreover, the same country might experience business 
cycle effects, which vary over time and are country specific. Furthermore, historical and cultural links 
may distinguish the trade relationship between one country and another with respect to any other 
possible trader. 
Page 12 of 33
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 - 13 -
In order to verify if trade preferences are endogeneous, we implement the 
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) endogeneity test, which compares the Least Squares 
Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimates and those obtained when using Instrumental 
Variables (IV) method.15 The evidence is that the p-values of the endogeneity test allow 
the rejection of the hypothesis of endogeneity of the preferential variables in all 
regressions we run.16  
Moreover, results could be flawed by the sample selection bias implied by the 
exclusion of zero-trade observations. Indeed, there could be a sample selection problem 
due to the fact that the process underlying the decision to export might be correlated to 
the gravity equation used to model the actual exports. If this correlation exists, 
disregarding the selection process yields biased estimates [see, i.e., the evidence 
provided by Helpman et al. (2008) and Piermartini and The (2005)]. Since we are 
considering dyadic fixed effects (eq. [2]), each pair of countries represents the 
statistical unit observed over time and we can test for the presence of non-random 
selection bias by adopting the method suggested by Wooldridge (1995), which “can be 
viewed as an extension of Heckman’s (1979) procedure to an unobserved effects 
framework” (p. 124).17 This procedure controls for unobserved heterogeneity by 
                                                 
15 When we estimate the gravity equation with the dummies GSPORD, GSPLDC, Other Preferences, and 
RTA the instruments are a polity score, a physical integrity rights index, a workers' rights variable 
and an empowerment rights index; when we run regressions with Pref Ord and RTA the instruments 
are a polity score and a physical integrity rights index only. The polity score is drawn from the 
POLITY IV database (available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/) and ranges from -10 
(high autocracy) to +10 (high democracy). The other variables are drawn from the Cingranelli-
Richards Human Rights (CIRI) Database 2004. The physical integrity rights index is an additive 
index constructed from the torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment and disappearance 
indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government 
respect for these four rights).  The Workers' Rights variable assumes the following values: severely 
restricted (0), somewhat restricted (1) or fully protected (2). The Empowerment Rights Index is an 
additive index constructed from the Freedom of Movement, Freedom of Speech, Workers’ Rights, 
Political Participation, and Freedom of Religion indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect 
for these five rights) to 10 (full government respect for these five rights). In our samples the 
endogenous variables are strongly correlated with the instruments, even after sifting out the other 
exogenous variables in the equation (namely population, GDP, and trend). Hence, by assuming that 
the same indicators are not correlated with the regression error term, the two “key identification 
conditions” (Wooldridge 2003, p. 496) are met and thus the instruments are valid. 
16 Results are not reported, but are available upon request from the authors. The same applies to all other 
outcomes discussed but not presented throughout the paper. 
17 The issue posed by zero-trade flows is also addressed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) who adopt a 
Poisson model to overcome the problem of heteroskedastic and non-normal residuals in gravity 
regressions. Recently, using Monte Carlo simulations, Martin and Pham (2008) assess the 
performance of different limited-dependent variable estimators concluding that “while the Poisson 
Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood estimator recommended by  Silva and Tenreyro (2006) solves the 
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adopting a fixed effects (FE) model, where the unobserved components are allowed to be 
correlated to the explanatory variables. Furthermore, the idiosyncratic errors may have 
serial dependence of unspecified form.18 As the Wooldridge (1995) test is almost never 
significant in estimations, the existence of selection bias is not supported in our sample. 
Given the results of the endogeneity and selection bias tests, we estimate the gravity 
model through a Fixed Effect Model and using the error decomposition as expressed in 
eq. [2]. When explaining the total exports and the total agricultural exports, we find that 
the estimated parameter associated with the Pref Ord variable is not significant. The 
same applies when using the three dummies Ordinary GSP,GSP for LDCs and Other 
preferences (only GSP for LDCs significantly affects total exports). We find analogous 
inconclusive findings when regressions are run at 2-digit level. 
These are not surprising outcomes, because the term ijυ  in eq. [2] absorbs the 
effects of any country-pair fixed effects (coefficients from 1λ  to 6λ  of eq. [1] are not 
estimated), including those of the trade preferences to which we are mainly interested 
in. Indeed, over the span period we consider, the preferential treatments are seldom 
revised, and basically are time-invariant.19 Their impact is likely to be subsumed by the 
dyadic effects. Therefore, we proceed by employing an alternative error term 
decomposition, which Brun et al. (2005, p.102) label as the “usual correction” for 
heterogeneity in gravity equations. Such an alternative method appears to be more 
suitable to the present study, as it allows estimation with greater accuracy of the 
coefficients of dyad variables displaying little time variation. Formally we assume that: 
ijtjiijtu εαα ++=          (3) 
                                                                                                                                               
heteroscedasticity-bias problem when this is the only problem, it appears to yield severely biased 
estimates when zero trade values are frequent”  (Martin and Pham, 2008, p. 1). 
18 The test proposed by Wooldridge (1995) requires to model two different, but potentially correlated, 
processes: the selection process, where the decision of whether to export or not is modeled through a 
probit equation, and the substantial process (equation [1]), in which the selection influence is taken 
into account by augmenting the regressions by the inverse Mills ratio (IMR or lambda) retrieved from 
the year-by-year probit estimates. The augmented regressions are estimated on the sample of positive 
export flows, and the significance of the IMR coefficient is tested by means of (robust) t-ratio. It is 
worth mentioning that the regressors included in the probit equation are the variables of the 
substantial equation. Therefore, the non-linearity of the inverse Mills ratio variable is the sole source 
of identification in the procedure we adopt to control for selection bias. 
19 Preferential dummies display a zero standard deviation over time for almost all the country-pairs in our 
sample (the percentage of zero standard deviation goes from a minimum of 93.5% for ordinary GSP 
to a maximum of 97.5% for GSP for LDC).  
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where iα and jα are time-invariant importer and exporter country fixed effects, 
respectively, and ijtε  is the idiosyncratic error term. The LSDV estimates obtained when 
using the decomposition [3] are summarized in tables 2 and 3.  It is worth noticing that 
the standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and adjusted by clustering 
observations at the country-pair level. This adjustment allows for error terms 
correlation within each couple of countries over time. Finally, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test confirms that the null hypothesis of endogeneity of NRPTPs may by rejected, 
whatever the data aggregation. 
 
6 Results  
When the gravity model is used to explain total exports (column 1 in tables 2 and 3), 
our evidence is consistent with that obtained by previous studies. Indeed, the standard 
gravity variables have the expected sign and the adjusted coefficient of determination 
(0.82) indicates that the model fits data quite well. More specifically, the GDPs of 
importers and exporters positively affect export flows and distance exerts a negative 
impact, whereas the coefficient associated with population is negative in the case of 
exporters and positive for importers. Furthermore, the variables LANG, COL, ISL, and 
RTA have the right sign, whereas BOR and LAND have not (however, results are 
significant for COL and ISL only). Similar evidence is found when analysing total 
agricultural exports, unless the change of the impact exerted by border (now positive 
and significant at 10%), island (now positive and highly significant), landlocked (now 
highly significant) and the change of the magnitude of other coefficients (i.e., GDP is 
much more important in explaining total exports than total agricultural exports; distance 
is less restrictive in the case of agricultural exports than for all goods). Finally, it is 
interesting to note that, in regressions of total agricultural exports, the LANG, COL and 
LAND parameters are higher than those obtained when explaining total exports. The 
picture changes when considering 2-digit agricultural products: we observe a reduction 
in the goodness of fit and numerous changes of the sign of the coefficients.20  
                                                 
20 The adjusted coefficient of determination ranges from 0.67 (feeding stuff for animals) to 0.8 
(miscellaneous edibles products), while the only variables with the same sign in all 10 regressions are 
distance (always negative and significant) and border (always positive and significant) (tables 2 and 
3). 
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As for the main aim of this paper, we find that all preferential dummies have a 
positive impact on total exports, even though the significance of GSP is very low (table 
2, column 1). When using total agricultural exports we find that all preference dummies 
are still positive and GSP dummies become highly significant: the values of the 
estimated coefficients are 0.19 for GSPORD, 0.74 for GSP for LDCs and 1.06 for Other 
preferences (table 2, column 2). The positive impact of trade preferences obtained at the 
two most aggregate levels (all commodities and agricultural products) holds entirely 
when we summarize the preferential treatment by using the variable Pref Ord (table 3). 
With regards the agricultural exports at 2-digit level, it emerges that only the 
meats sector gains from the ordinary GSP, whereas this program has a negative impact  
on the remaining sectors, albeit significantly in only two cases (live animals and sugar). 
Furthermore, the GSP for LDCs exerts a positive and significant effect in only one 
sector (vegetables and fruits), while in two sectors (live animals and dairy products) the 
impact is negative and significant. Finally, the  largest impact comes from the dummy 
Other Preferences, whose estimated coefficient is positive and significant in 7 out of 10 
groups of products (meat, fish, cereals, vegetables, sugar, coffee, tea, cocoa and spices, 
miscellaneous edible products and preparations) and negative and significant only in 
the sector of feeding stuff for animals (table 2). This heterogeneity in results decreases 
when regressions include the polytomous variable Pref Ord (table 3).21, 22  
 
[Tables 2 and 3, about here] 
 
Finally, in order to produce further evidence by allowing the specific country 
effects to vary over time, we run equation 1 in a cross-section setting for each year from 
1995 to 2003. Rather than tabulating all the estimates obtained, we focus only on the 
findings obtained with the polytomous variable Pref Ord, whatever the data 
                                                 
21 When using the variable Pref Ord, we obtain that NRPTPs  positively affect the exports of beneficiary 
countries in six groups of products, while only the exports of feeding stuff for animals are penalized 
by the preferential treatments granted by the eight OECD members considered in the paper. 
22 In order to take into account multilateral trade resistance (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004; Baldwin 
and Taglioni, 2006) all the estimations have been replicated by allowing the country-specific effects 
to vary over time. We find similar results to those reported in the paper and one reason may be that 
our panel spans a relatively short period.  
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aggregation.23 The estimated coefficients and their statistical significance using 
aggregated data are depicted over time in figures 1 and 2, while appendix C reports the 
10 graphs concerning the agricultural exports at the 2-digit level.24 When total exports 
are concerned (figures 1 and 2), the evidence confirms the positive significant impact of 
NRPTPs in each year of the period under scrutiny. If we split the sample along 
agricultural commodity lines, the impact of NRPTPs is positive and significant over 
most of the period analyzed in four sectors (fruit and vegetable, sugar, coffee and tea 
commodities and miscellaneous), while in the other cases the preferential coefficient is 
often not significant and sometimes negative. 
The synthesis of previous results is that the ordinary GSP exerts a negative, albeit 
often not significant, impact in many 2-digit groups. This might be due to the high costs 
of complying with the relevant rules of origin that are required to exporters by OECD 
countries under the GSP scheme. Furthermore, the role of GSP for LDCs is positive for 
most of the sectors, although it is significant only for vegetables and fruits. This finding 
is partially consistent with the fact that the preferences of GSP for LDCs are larger than 
those given under the ordinary GSP. Finally, the effect of trade preferences other than 
GSP is positive and significant in several sectors and significantly negative only for the 
feeding stuff for animals industry. 
  
[Figures 1 and 2, about here] 
 
7 Conclusions  
 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature which uses gravity models to assess 
the impact of non reciprocal preferential trade policies (NRPTPs) granted by developed 
to developing countries. 
                                                 
23 As Subramanian and Wei (2007) highlight, this also allows the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables to vary over time, at the expenses of a potential loss of efficiency, which is negligible given 
the large dataset employed. 
24 The procedure to consider cross-section regressions on a yearly basis yields an impressive number of 
results (i.e., 18 regressions for total exports, 18 regressions for total agricultural exports and 180 
regressions for products at 2-digit). We provide all these results upon request. Moreover, it is worth 
mentioning that, in all the cross-section regressions, specific country effects are included to account 
for multilateral resistance à la Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004), the observations have been 
clustered at the country-pair level and, to avoid multicollinearity problems with the country effects, 
the GDPs and populations enter the annual regressions as products (see, for instance, Rose 2004 and 
2005b). 
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After reviewing the related literature, we argue that the assessment of the impact 
of trade preferences should be carried out using disaggregated data rather than total 
exports, as discriminatory trade agreements apply at product level. In order to support 
our claim, we analyse export flows towards eight OECD members (EU, USA, Japan, 
Norway, Switzerland, Australia, Canada and New Zealand) and employ three levels of 
data aggregation (total exports, total agricultural exports and 2-digit agricultural 
products). The coverage of trade preferences is very comprehensive, as the OECD 
countries we consider grant most of the NRPTPs currently active. 
The empirical results can be summarized as follows. Initial key evidence refers 
to the positive impact of trade preferences on total exports of beneficiaries. This finding 
is found in all the regressions we run using a polytomous variable to proxy the 
preferential treatments and is confirmed when we consider separate and mutually 
exclusive dummy variables for each preferential scheme, although in this case the main 
source of trade gains for beneficiaries is given by NRPTPs other than GSP.  
A second outcome concerns the effectiveness of trade preferences at 2-digit 
level. It emerges that the effect of ordinary GSP, GSP for LDCs and Other preferences 
is not always positive and statistically significant. When this evidence is compared to 
that obtained at aggregated level it reveals how the aggregation influences the impact of 
trade preferences. We find that the NRPTPs granted by OECD members to developing 
countries are not always a story of success, something which emerges when using 
aggregated data. In fact, some sectors gain from the status of being preferred in terms of 
access into OECD markets, while others do not. When using the ordered variable at 2-
digit level, we find that the effectiveness of NRPTPs is positive and significant only for 
some groups of products. This outcome might be due to the fact that the margin of trade 
preferences widely varies across sectors and donors and invites further investigation. 
To summarize, although the NRPTPs increase, on average, the overall exports 
of beneficiary countries, we also show how the preferential impact is heterogeneous 
across 2-digit sectors and data aggregations. Therefore, the present paper should be 
considered as the first step in a promising line of research. While we have mostly 
focused on evaluating the impact of NRPTPs using gravity equations and modelling 
trade preferences with the dummy variables approach, future work should refine the 
measures of preferential treatments. Indeed, the dummy variables approach is 
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problematic as dummies capture a range of other country-pair specific effects 
contemporaneous with preferential treatment. Moreover, dummy variables treat all the 
beneficiary countries as a homogenous group and they don’t allow to discern among 
the different preferential trade policies (preferential tariff margins, preferential quotas, 
reduced “entry prices”) as well as they do not measure the level of trade preferences 
(i.e., dummies impose that the level of preferential schemes under Ordinary GSP is the 
same of those under Everything But Arms Initiative). Hence, a natural next step of this 
paper is to conduct empirical analyses at very disaggregated levels and to include in 
the gravity equation explicit measures of the trade preferences granted to the exports of 
developing countries. Conclusions on the role of NRPTPs are likely to be revised after 
the refining  of the measurement of preferential treatments.  
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Appendix A: The exporting countries included in the sample 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, 
Aruba, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, 
Belize, Benin, Bermuda, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei 
Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, 
Cayman Islands, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, China Hong Kong SAR, China 
Macao SAR, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, EU15, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, FS Micronesia, Fiji, Finland, French Polynesia, Gabon, Gambia, 
Georgia, Ghana, Greenland, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, 
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, 
Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, 
Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mexico, Mongolia,  Morocco, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nether. Antilles, New Caledonia, New Zealand,  Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Singapore, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, 
Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, TFYR of Macedonia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-
Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,  Turkmenistan, USA, Uganda, 
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, 
Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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Appendix B: Trade agreements covered 
 
Bilateral trade agreements 
 
USA-Israel (since 1985),  USA-Jordan (since 2001), NAFTA (USA-Mexico and Canada, since 
1994), Australia-New Zealand (since 2003), Australia-Singapore (since 2003), New Zealand-
Singapore (since 2001), Australia-Papua New Guinea, Japan-Singapore (since 2002), Canada-
Chile (since 1997), Canada-Costa-Rica (2002), Canada-Israel (since 1997), the RTAs of EU15 
with Iceland, Norway/EFTA, Switzerland/EFTA, Algeria, Syria, Andorra (since 1991), 
Bulgaria and Romania (1993), Turkey (1996), Tunisia (1998), Israel (2000), Mexico (2000),  
Morocco (2000),  South Africa (2000), Republic of Macedonia (2001), Croatia (2002) Jordan 
(2002), Chile and Lebanon (2003). Finally, we consider the preferences granted by EFTA 
members (Norway and Switzerland) to Turkey (1992), Bulgaria (1994), Israel and Romania 
(1993), Morocco (2000), Republic of Macedonia (2001), Mexico (2001), Croatia (2002), 
Jordan (2002) and Singapore (2003). We do not consider the RTA signed after 2003 [such as 
EU and Egypt (2004), USA and Chile (2004), USA and Singapore (since 2004),  EFTA and 
Chile (2004)]. 
 
Non-Reciprocal Preferential Trade Policies 
 
We considered the preferences that the EU grants to 77 African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries (ACP) under the Cotonou Agreement (or before 2000 under the IV Lomé 
Convention), the preferences granted since 2001 to Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia 
Herzegovina, Croatia, the TFYR of Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro), and those granted 
to the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) constitutionally linked to Denmark, France, 
the Netherlands and UK. With regards the USA, one important unilateral  trade arrangement is 
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) through which, since 2001, exports of nearly 
6500 products from 48 Sub-Saharan African countries have entered the US market duty-free. 
Furthermore, under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) 24 countries enjoy preferential 
treatment for access to the US market, as do Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru who signed 
the US Andean Trade Promotion Act (ATPA) in 2001. With regards to Canada, we consider the 
Caribbean Commonwealth Countries Tariff (CCCT),  which is a tariff treatment which has 
been unilaterally extended to 18 countries since the 1980s. Under the South Pacific Regional 
Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA), New Zealand and Australia have 
offered duty free access to exports of the 14 developing island member countries of the Forum 
Island Countries (FICs) since 1981. Norway, Japan and Switzerland offer preferential treatment 
to developing countries under the GSP scheme only. 
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Appendix C: The impact of trade preferences over time. OLS estimates at 2-digit 
agricultural level. 
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Table 1: Bilateral Trade Flows by preference (1995-2003)       
  Total Trade Total agricultural products 
2-digit agricultural 
products 
  
Positive 
trade 
flows 
only 
Full 
sample 
(positive 
and zero 
trade 
flows) 
Positive 
trade 
flows 
only 
Full 
sample 
(positive 
and zero 
trade 
flows) 
Positive 
trade 
flows only
Full sample 
(positive 
and zero 
trade flows)
Not Preferred Trade Flows  (A) 3295 3645 2524 3835 14563 38340
Preferred Trade Flows (B)  8162 8910 6768 8910 28955 89100
     Ordinary GSP only (B1) 4725 5018 4085 5018 19420 50180
     GSP for LDCs only (B2) 2154 2559 1459 2559 3121 25590
     Other Preferences only (B3) 71 79 58 79 341 790
Ordinary GSP & Other Pref. (B4) 757 785 729 785 4117 7850
GSP for LDCs & Other Pref. (B5) 455 469 437 469 1956 4690
Total (A+B) 11457 12555 9292 12745 43518 127440
Source: own computations.       
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Table 2:  LSDV estimates of the gravity model by using dycotomous variables to measure trade preferences. 
               Dependent Variable:  real  exports in logs to eight OECD countries (1995-2003).
Total 
Exports
Total 
Agricultura
l Exports
Live 
Animals    
(SITC 00)
Meat and 
Meat 
preparations 
(SITC 01)
Dairy 
Products and 
Bird Eggs    
(SITC 02)
Fish, 
Crustaceans 
Mollusc and 
Aqua     (SITC 
03)
Cereals and 
Cereal 
Preparations 
(SITC 04)
Vegetables 
and Fruits 
(SITC 05)
 Sugar, Sugar 
Preparations 
and Honey 
(SITC 06)
Coffee, Tea, 
Cocoa, 
Spices       
(SITC 07)
Feeding Stuff 
for Animals   
(SITC 08)
Miscellaneous 
Edible Products 
and Preparations 
(SITC 09)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
GSPORD 0.15 0.19 -0.61 0.34 -0.22 -0.02 -0.44 -0.03 -0.21 0.01 -0.01 -0.24
(1.31) (1.61) -(2.72) (1.20) -(1.10) -(0.14) -(2.50) -(0.23) -(1.21) (0.10) -(0.04) -(1.72)
GSPLDC 0.09 0.74 -0.73 0.81 -1.37 0.32 0.11 0.97 0.63 0.40 -0.53 0.71
(0.36) (3.21) -(2.43) (0.89) -(2.30) (0.84) (0.30) (2.08) (0.96) (0.92) -(0.82) (1.51)
Other Preferences 1.13 1.06 -0.31 1.14 0.04 0.66 0.52 1.07 2.07 0.41 -1.16 1.16
(5.81) (5.73) -(1.06) (2.30) (0.10) (2.34) (1.55) (4.18) (4.83) (1.73) -(3.23) (4.39)
RTA 0.04 -0.13 0.79 -0.30 0.25 -0.28 0.86 -0.06 0.58 0.67 -0.40 0.59
(0.17) -(0.60) (1.87) -(0.70) (0.89) -(1.02) (2.81) -(0.26) (2.02) (2.12) -(1.32) (2.38)
ln(POP_importers) 0.87 0.82 1.49 1.23 0.31 0.32 0.63 1.61 1.52 1.30 0.71 1.71
(4.61) (4.43) (4.36) (3.09) (0.65) (1.30) (2.17) (7.09) (4.72) (5.86) (1.66) (7.35)
ln(GDP_importers) 0.35 0.28 -0.30 -0.04 0.55 0.96 0.17 -0.77 -0.62 -0.32 0.23 -0.88
(2.02) (1.62) -(0.95) -(0.11) (1.30) (4.23) (0.64) -(3.61) -(2.08) -(1.55) (0.59) -(4.06)
ln(POP_exporters) -2.23 -1.27 -0.93 -1.22 -0.45 0.50 -0.79 0.59 -1.56 -1.52 -1.61 -1.48
-(4.97) -(2.57) -(0.82) -(1.09) -(0.38) (0.59) -(0.75) (1.02) -(1.20) -(2.07) -(1.43) -(1.97)
ln(GDP_exporters) 0.60 0.25 -0.02 0.23 -0.23 0.03 0.26 0.38 0.26 0.30 0.45 0.53
(4.35) (2.32) -(0.10) (1.20) -(0.88) (0.20) (1.33) (3.38) (1.55) (2.42) (1.70) (3.30)
ln(Distance) -1.23 -1.15 -0.91 -0.72 -0.68 -1.15 -0.71 -1.19 -0.64 -0.70 -1.43 -0.87
-(16.22) -(14.97) -(7.06) -(4.06) -(4.70) -(11.70) -(6.22) -(11.67) -(5.48) -(6.79) -(9.04) -(9.05)
Border -0.17 0.58 1.71 2.29 0.74 0.76 1.13 0.64 1.38 0.98 0.98 0.93
-(0.57) (1.61) (3.42) (5.14) (1.71) (1.70) (2.61) (1.95) (4.05) (2.69) (2.08) (2.57)
Language 0.09 0.13 -0.03 -0.04 0.21 0.29 0.87 0.22 -0.14 0.41 0.08 0.20
(0.65) (0.97) -(0.16) -(0.10) (0.71) (1.58) (3.80) (1.32) -(0.51) (2.41) (0.30) (1.14)
Colony 0.36 0.99 -0.28 0.03 -0.51 0.40 -0.15 0.91 0.20 0.25 0.80 -0.24
(2.30) (6.43) -(1.37) (0.10) -(1.72) (2.14) -(0.75) (5.19) (0.75) (1.57) (2.69) -(1.39)
Island -0.30 0.40 0.41 1.10 0.81 1.21 0.36 -0.33 0.41 0.10 1.22 0.58
-(2.79) (3.88) (2.31) (4.03) (3.53) (9.02) (2.07) -(2.37) (0.21) (0.71) (5.54) (3.78)
Landlocked 0.21 0.55 0.67 2.66 -1.03 0.07 -0.32 0.70 0.00 0.72 -0.62 -0.16
(1.29) (3.48) (2.12) (8.15) -(2.23) (0.29) -(1.28) (4.07) (0.01) (3.38) -(1.68) -(0.75)
Constant -57.11 27.19 22.14 93.82 -84.17 37.29 -127.05 53.09 4.04 75.41 -10.31 -117.71
-(4.00) (1.82) (0.81) (2.50) -(2.22) (1.55) -(4.63) (3.01) (0.15) (3.82) -(0.30) -(5.51)
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-
sq. test 2.17 2.26 8.26 2.34 1.36 0.85 2.89 6.38 2.00 6.77 1.50 6.95
(p-value) (0.70) (0.69) (0.08) (0.67) (0.85) (0.93) (0.58) (0.17) (0.74) (0.15) (0.83) (0.14)
Observations 10644 8791 3167 2599 2359 5938 4078 6568 3978 6325 2809 4182
R-squared adj. 0.82 0.80 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.74 0.73 0.78 0.68 0.76 0.67 0.80
Note: All regressions include a trend variable.
t.students in parenthesis (robust to heteroskedasticity and adjusted by clustering observations at the country-pair level).  
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Table 3:  LSDV estimates of the gravity model by using a polytomous variable (Pref_Ord) to measure trade preferences. 
                Dependent Variable:  real  exports in logs to eight OECD countries (1995-2003).
Total 
Exports
Total 
Agricultural 
Exports
Live Animals   
(SITC 00)
Meat and Meat 
preparations     
(SITC 01)
Dairy 
Products and 
Bird Eggs    
(SITC 02)
Fish, 
Crustaceans, 
Mollusc and 
Aqua     (SITC 
03)
Cereals and 
Cereal 
Preparations 
(SITC 04)
Vegetables 
and Fruits 
(SITC 05)
 Sugar, Sugar 
Preparations 
and Honey 
(SITC 06)
Coffee, Tea, 
Cocoa, 
Spices       
(SITC 07)
Feeding Stuff 
for Animals   
(SITC 08)
Miscellaneous 
Edible Products 
and Preparations 
(SITC 09)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Pref_Ord 0.30 0.23 -0.05 0.23 -0.09 0.09 0.02 0.23 0.37 0.17 -0.28 0.21
(6.54) (5.36) -(0.88) (1.95) -(0.86) (1.48) (0.23) (4.19) (3.48) (3.40) -(3.17) (3.11)
RTA 0.05 -0.13 0.78 -2.29 0.26 -0.29 0.83 -0.03 0.59 0.72 -0.40 0.56
(0.21) -(0.57) (1.78) -(0.69) (0.90) -(1.05) (2.73) -(0.14) (2.10) (2.32) -(1.31) (2.31)
ln(POP_importers) 0.88 0.83 1.51 1.23 0.34 0.36 0.67 1.63 1.56 1.27 0.70 1.77
(4.65) (4.48) (4.50) (3.09) (0.71) (1.48) (2.26) (7.19) (4.84) (5.69) (1.62) (7.44)
ln(GDP_importers) 0.34 0.27 -0.31 -0.04 0.53 0.93 0.15 -0.79 -0.63 -0.03 0.24 -0.93
(1.94) (1.57) -(0.99) -(0.10) (1.26) (4.09) (0.55) -(3.70) -(2.11) -(1.45) (0.62) -(4.16)
ln(POP_exporters) -2.23 -1.35 -0.85 -1.52 -0.64 0.41 -0.92 0.52 -1.86 -1.57 -1.36 -1.52
-(4.96) -(2.70) -(0.78) -(1.38) -(0.55) (0.50) -(0.87) (0.90) -(1.36) -(2.16) -(1.20) -(2.08)
ln(GDP_exporters) 0.60 0.26 -0.02 0.23 -0.22 0.04 0.28 0.39 0.25 0.30 0.43 0.52
(4.38) (2.37) -(0.15) (1.22) -(0.86) (0.29) (1.45) (3.44) (1.48) (2.48) (1.63) (3.24)
ln(Distance) -1.25 -1.16 -0.99 -0.72 -0.72 -1.19 -0.79 -1.22 -0.73 -0.67 -1.40 -0.95
-(16.91) -(15.68) -(7.45) -(4.18) -(5.15) -(11.93) -(6.87) -(12.33) -(6.31) -(6.67) -(9.02) -(9.90)
Border -0.16 0.58 1.74 2.26 0.72 0.72 1.15 0.67 1.40 1.07 0.94 0.93
-(0.52) (1.58) (3.23) (5.09) (1.63) (1.59) (2.57) (1.98) (4.00) (2.95) (2.01) (2.50)
Language 0.11 0.15 -0.03 -0.07 0.19 0.31 0.92 0.27 -0.12 0.42 0.07 0.24
(0.79) (1.08) -(0.16) -(0.19) (0.66) (1.70) (3.96) (1.65) -(0.45) (2.45) (0.24) (1.38)
Colony 0.39 0.93 -0.25 0.02 -0.52 0.38 -0.17 0.81 0.11 0.16 0.83 -0.27
(2.57) (6.13) -(1.19) (0.06) -(1.76) (1.98) -(0.82) (4.59) (0.41) (1.01) (2.78) -(1.53)
Island -0.29 0.40 0.36 1.09 0.81 1.21 0.48 -0.28 0.19 0.13 1.20 0.67
-(2.70) (3.94) (2.05) (3.96) (3.56) (8.97) (2.72) -(2.09) (0.99) (1.03) (5.40) (4.50)
Landlocked 0.19 0.55 0.68 2.66 -1.04 0.06 -0.33 0.72 0.01 0.74 -0.64 -0.14
(1.15) (3.49) (2.18) (8.12) -(2.25) (0.27) -(1.32) (4.13) (0.02) (3.48) -(1.73) -(0.68)
Constant -56.28 26.75 27.52 93.17 -80.28 36.23 -128.45 56.38 9.50 77.73 -13.02 -113.81
-(3.93) (1.79) (1.02) (2.51) -(2.13) (1.52) -(4.68) (3.16) (0.34) (3.95) -(0.38) -(5.31)
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-
sq. test 0.54 0.51 4.03833 0.39 0.04 0.14 0.81 5.32 1.30 5.39 1.56 5.02
(p-value) (0.76) (0.77) (0.13) (0.82) (0.98) (0.93) (0.67) (0.07) (0.52) (0.07) (0.46) (0.08)
Observations 10644 8791 3167 2599 2359 5938 4078 6568 3978 6325 2809 4182
R-squared adj. 0.82 0.80 0.71 0.73 0.72 0.74 0.72 0.78 0.67 0.76 0.67 0.80
Note: All regressions include a trend variable.
t.students in parenthesis (robust to heteroskedasticity and adjusted by clustering observations at the country-pair level).
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Evaluating the Impact of Non-Reciprocal Trade Preferences Using Gravity 
Models  (AE-08-0034) 
 
 
Reply to the first referee 
 
 
Short Reply. In writing the revised version of the paper we have taken into account many of your 
suggestions and clarified many aspects that in the first version were confused. The current version 
takes great advantage of your remarks and we thank you for your very useful report. 
 
General comments. 
We fully agree with you in arguing that the dummy approach does not properly capture how trade 
preferences actually work. Indeed, the paper concludes reporting some caveats on the use of 
dummies and in the revised version we largely expand this discussion (pages 18-19).1 
 
While a better alternative to dummies are tariffs, we have not used tariffs for two main reasons, the 
first of which depends on data availability, whereas the second is related to the main scope of our 
paper. 
 
In respect of tariffs data availability, there is not, to the best of our knowledge, a source 
• covering the period we consider, 
• including all the preference-giving countries we are interested in, and  
• providing data for each trade preferential program.  
 
For instance, data from Macmap (a dataset provided by CEPII, 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/macmap.htm ) is limited to 2001 and 2004 and applied tariffs 
do not distinguish among individual preferential program (GSP, ACP, AGOA, SPARTECA, .. ).   
 
DBTAR, the dataset by Gallezot (2005), includes only the trade preferences of European Union 
http://tradeag.vitamib.com/hnb/TRADEAG/TRADEAG.nsf/all/5574DF434B466138C12571EF003
5BD18?opendocument.  
 
                                                 
1 Incidentally, it is worth mentioning that in many already published papers in relevant journals, the use of 
dummies to measure trade issues similar to ours is still dominant. For instance, Sarker and Jayasinghe 
(2007, Agricultural Economics), in estimating the impact of EU’s Regional Trade Agreements augment 
their gravity equation with a dummy, Lee and park  (2005, The World Economy) use the same approach to 
investigate the effect of free trade areas in East Asia. Bun and Klaassen (2007, Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics) employ the dummies to evaluate the Euro effect on trade. The same 
methodology is shared Rose  (“Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade?” American Economic  
Review 2004),  Rose and van Wincoop (“National money as a barrier to trade: The real case for monetary 
union”. American Economic Review, 2001),  Rose (“One reason countries pay their debts: renegotiation 
and international trade. Journal of Development Economics , 2005), Medved (“Preferential Trade 
Agreements and Their Role in World Trade” World Bank Research Working Paper, 2006)  n. 4038), 
Endoh  (“Trade creation and trade diversion in the EEC, the LAFTA and the CMEA: 1960- 1994.  Applied 
Economics, 1999), Fidrmuc and  Fidrmuc (“Disintegration and trade” Review of International Economics , 
2003), Frankel, Stein and Wei (“Trading blocs and the Americas: The natural, the unnatural, and the super-
natural”, Journal of Development Economics, 1995), Glick and  Rose (“Does a currency union affect 
trade? The time series evidence, European Economic Review, 2002), Thom and B. Walsh  (“The effect of a 
common currency on trade: lessons from the Irish experience. European Economic Review, 2002), Yeyati 
(“On the impact of a common currency on bilateral trade. Economics Letters; 2003). 
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Another important source is WITS, the system developed by the World Bank and UNCTAD. WITS  
reports the MFN and the applied tariffs but has two relevant shortcomings. The first regards its time 
coverage, because of the many-many missing values over the period to which we are interested in. 
Secondly, and more importantly for our paper, it does not distinguish among preferential schemes. 
In other words, we cannot obtain tariffs for each individual preferential scheme separately. This 
second peculiarity impedes to use tariffs from this source, which are surely suitable to address trade 
issues other than those of our paper. That is to say, data from WITS are very useful to evaluate the 
impact of trade preferential policies granted by a developed country, when the analysts is not 
interest in knowing the impact of a specific preferential scheme (GSP or others), as it is, on the 
contrary, our case. Similar arguments apply for Macmap, although this source allows for cross 
sectional studies, only. 
 
The second reason supporting the use of the dummy approach regards the fact that the paper intends 
to provide evidence on the heterogeneous impacts of NRPTPs when using a level of data 
aggregation different than that used in the related literature. The empirical setting using gravity 
models and dummies for individual preferential scheme allows us to shed some lights on the fact 
that the studies (ours and those by others) analysing the impact of NRPTPs on total trade flows 
provide results that must be carefully read. We have clarified this point in the introduction of the 
revised version of the paper (pages 2-3) and in the last lines of the conclusions. 
 
Specific  comments   
 
1. We fully agree with your comment on note 2 of the first version of the paper. After long 
discussing we have decided to cancel the note because in so doing we do not lose any 
relevant information for our research. Furthermore, we also agree on the fact that the 
aggregation bias is also present if the use of tariffs was possible.2 The way to avoid the 
aggregation bias is to use data (trade and tariffs) at very disaggregated levels, as we mention 
in the conclusions of the current version of the paper. This is another paper and is left for 
future work.  
 
2. Prompted by the referee, in footnote 11 of the first version,  on one hand, we acknowledge 
that there might be heteroskedasticity problems (as pointed out by Santos Silva and Teneyro 
2006). On the other hand, we recall a recent contribution by Martin and Pham (2008), in 
which Santos Silva and Teneyro’s findings are re-examined under data generating process 
that generate substantial numbers of true zero observations. We summarize this relevant 
question in the note 17 of the current version of the paper. 
 
3. You are right. In the new version of the paper we eliminate the controversial statement 
“have seldom been used...”. Moreover, we have followed your suggestion to shorten the 
literature review. 
 
4. As you observe, the old footnote #5 could sound as a criticism. In our intention, it was 
meant just to describe a previous work, but we agree that it was not well written. In the new 
version, the footnote has been restated. 
 
5. Following your suggestion, we now enumerate tariffs among the factors that may hinder 
bilateral trade flows. 
                                                 
2 A recent discussion on this issue is provided by Cipollina M. and Salvatici L. (2008), “Measuring Protection: Mission 
Impossible?”, Journal of Economic Surveys 22:3, 577–616. 
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6. Referring to previous footnote #9, you question the point that Helpman et al (2008) 
addresses another strand of the literature. You are right. In order to avoid sounding 
overstating our paper, the new introduction no longer enumerates the method  that we adopt 
to deal with zero-trade observations  as a relevant innovation of our contribution. 
Nevertheless, since it has been largely neglected by the extant literature, we still emphasise 
(page 14) the importance of controlling for non-random selection bias. 
 
7. Welcoming  your suggestion, we have shortened the discussion on zero bilateral trade flows 
(now the discussion is at the end of section 4). Furthermore, in new version of the paper, we 
have put together previous sections 4 and 5 and we have eliminated many redundancies.   
 
8. We define the acronym LSDV on page 13. 
 
9. The footnote #18 has been restated in, so as to clarify what the lambda the inverse Mills 
ratio variable refers to. 
 
10. You question about the value added to report equations 3 and 4. After discussing, we have 
decided to delete the equations and maintain some parts of previous comments because we 
believe they are important to motivate the use of our error decomposition. 
 
11. You are right. In writing the new version of the paper we have cancelled many redundancies 
in commenting the results and in rewriting the conclusions.  
 
12. Prompted by you, the references have been updated. 
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Evaluating the Impact of Non-Reciprocal Trade Preferences Using Gravity 
Models  (AE-08-0034) 
 
 
Reply to the second  referee 
 
 
In writing the revised version of the paper we have considered your suggestions and clarified many 
aspects that in the first version were confused. We thank you for your very useful comments. 
 
In what follows we briefly describe our responses to your specific comment/suggestions.  
 
 
 
1. We agree. The revised version of the paper (page 4, note 4) includes some references 
concerning the theoretical derivation of the gravity equation. 
 
2. Following your suggestion, we drop section 5, giving a more concise discussion of the 
problem of zero trade flow at the end of the current section 4. We have also shortened the 
discussion on the way of solving the overlapping of preferential treatments. 
 
3. In presenting our test on endogeneity we quote (page 12) the paper by Baier and Bergstrand 
(2004, JIE). 
 
4 As suggested by you, we have reduced the description of the Wooldridge (1995) procedure 
(the analogue of the Heckman, 1979, method for an unobserved effects framework), 
previously reported at page 17, confining some details to footnote 18 of the revised version 
of the paper (page 14). To avoid cluttering, we have decided to omit the discussion of the 
first stage results. The reason is that the Wooldridge procedure is here adopted only to test 
for selection bias and involves estimating a large number of probit equations (namely a 
different probit for each year of the analysis). 
 
5. We agree with you in specifying the gravity equation using the different decomposition of 
random disturbances that use time-variant fixed effects. We have re-estimated all our 
regressions with time-variant fixed effects, but the results are the same of those obtained 
when using time-invariant fixed effects. The note 22 at page 16 mentions what we have 
done. 
 
6. We have clarified (page 15) what the statement “adjusted for  clustering on country-pair 
fixed effect” means. 
 
7. While the conclusion of the revised version of the paper includes new arguments against the 
dummy variable approach (as requested by the other referee), we have eliminated many 
redundancies of the old version, without loosing any qualitative result. The current 
conclusions are shorter than the previous ones. 
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